The military is often called the world’s oldest profession. This attempt at humour contains a grain of truth, one which highlights key aspects of human nature. Sadly, war has been an enduring characteristic of all human societies. Over the millennia, the nature of war, like human nature, has remained constant even as the nature of warfare has changed century to century, year to year and now, almost day to day. But there has been one constant locked at the centre of all of this change: infantry remains the essential component of all warfare.
It is worth our time to pause and consider that fact. The span of military technology is breathtakingly broad. Humans have moved from stone tools, to slings, to bows and arrows, to gunpowder and horses, to nuclear propulsion, and autonomous satellite-controlled ballistic missiles. But, in spite of that incredible advancement and sophistication in technology as it applies to warfare, one truism remains: successful warfare depends on the infantry. There is no way around it. Until you put troops onto the ground that you need to control, dominate, or own, there is no final victory. You can punish your enemy with aerial bombardment for years and in manifold forms but until bayonets are at the throat of your opponent, there will be no surrender.
As of this month, it has been reported in various media (The Wall Street Journal and the New York Times) that Russia is actually outproducing the US in military ammunitions and systems. This should not be surprising since Russia has moved its economy to a war footing with a reputed 60%-80% of economic activity being pushed into wartime production needs.[1] But what is the underlying situation? They are actually losing ground that they once held. Russian casualties are continually rising, estimated now to be over 1,500 dead and wounded per day and occasionally surpassing 2,000. All this in spite of more weaponry and a demonstrably steep learning curve regarding how to fight the Ukrainians. Something doesn’t add up. With all of these weapons and learning, should not the Russian situation be improving?
Here is the key component that most (but not all) observers seem to be missing: Russian infantry is for all intents and purposes UNTRAINED. You can dress up a thousand teenaged boys, give them weapons, and call them a battalion, but that does not make them infantry. It makes them targets.
Historically, members of the infantry have been the butt of jokes. They have been referred to as cannon fodder, dog faces, and a panoply of other derogatory terms all meant to convey that they are nothing more than warm bodies that are pushed into battle. But that bears no resemblance to reality — especially when that infantry is part of a professional army. Like all armour officers of my generation I had to pass basic infantry training before being allowed to put my hands on expensive and complex armoured vehicles. Quite apart from the sometimes-unbearable physical demands put upon infantry soldiers, we all soon discovered just how many skills they had, and how broadly-based those skills actually were. From simple weapons handling and map reading to understanding radios, tactics, cryptography, terrain recognition and literally scores of other skills — any one of which, if not mastered, could get you killed, there was the challenge of going without sleep and surviving harsh weather. All of this was BEFORE we get to actual combat skills. And all of this was for basic infantry training.
What are we to conclude from this cursory investigation? There is increasing talk of possible mass mobilization in Russia in order to ready itself for a new spring offensive. Estimates of new recruits range anywhere from 250,000 to 500,000 which on its face seems daunting. But, considering how poorly trained Russia’s original wave of “professional” soldiers were and how little training subsequent recruits have received since the 2022 invasion, my conclusion is that Ukraine’s biggest worry will be that it may run out of bullets before Russia runs out of infantry.
[1] It is an interesting paradox that the more Russia puts into its wartime economy, the longer and more difficult it will become post-war to rebuild its already rudimentary economy.
