Let’s look at this issue from a strategic point of view. In my personal opinion, if there were a blatant attack on Estonia, or Latvia, or (name the NATO member) and that country invoked Article 5 of the NATO Charter, then I believe that NATO would respond. How NATO would respond is a different issue. There would be individual countries that might not offer combat troops; by the same token, there might be countries that would start moving large military forces immediately as a sign of solidarity.

Remember that the alliance is a confederation of independent states. This is not like 1914, where Britain declared war on Imperial Germany and all of the dominions were suddenly also at war. Further, this isn’t a game of checkers where you take one of my pieces and then I respond by taking one of yours. Look at the map. The three most vulnerable NATO members both geographically and militarily, are Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Not only because they are the smallest, but also because it would be difficult for NATO forces to strike back at Russia directly in support of their calls for assistance. Here is where strategy comes into play.

Let’s consider the most difficult case: Estonia (ergo the title of this post). Latvian and Lithuanian forces are not large enough to defend their own territory and simultaneously send major assistance to Estonia. Finland has already raised its level of preparedness, but they are ‘malpositioned’ to immediately rush to Estonia’s aid. Next comes Poland, and this is where the situation changes. Poland’s army is indeed large enough to secure its own border with Belarus and send a large formation to help a neighbour. But would that be the wise move strategically?

Not necessarily.

Consider an alternative, and variations thereof. Striking Russia directly through Estonia would certainly give the Russians the propaganda images they needed to declare “an invasion of the Motherland” by a hostile NATO. Much like NATO commanders’ inability to cross the Inner German Border (IGB) when the Berlin Wall existed, crossing into Russia might be counterproductive. So, how to demonstrate to Russia their provocations would lead to war?

There are several possibilities, some of which could easily be combined. Polish forces could cross in strength into Ukraine and with Ukrainian permission, move east to just short of where they might meet Russian forces; simultaneously, NATO forces could target all known Russian headquarters in occupied Ukraine; NATO air forces could create air supremacy over Ukraine and shoot down any Russian aerial vehicles in that airspace. The possibilities are manifold but certainly, the point could be made clear to Russia: Article 5 is in effect, and the alliance takes it seriously; the next provocation would involve Russian territory.

None of these actions are mutually exclusive and as I said, there are combinations and permutations, not least of which would be the entrapment of Kaliningrad, a solitary Russian oblast sandwiched by Belarus to its north and Poland to its south. The ‘Kaliningrad Question’ has lain dormant for some time. When the USSR broke apart, the oblast was stranded on the coast of the Baltic Sea with no contiguous connection with the remainder of Russia. The isolated exclave is heavily fortified with Russian forces and even though the 2004 expansion of the European Union severed it from Mother Russia, the oblast remains ready to slice through the narrow Suwalki Gap, the 100-kilometer corridor between Poland and Lithuania, on its way to rejoin Russian forces in Belarus. But could they get out with one or more Polish armoured divisions staring into their flank? doubtful at best.

All of this is obviously moot, but I point out these variations to demonstrate that although it may seem like there are few options for NATO to react short of going to a general war footing, such options are plentiful (and likely already being investigated by various planning staffs in a multitude of countries).

Let us hope that Putin does not make the same mistake as Trump with Iran for although the situation may be moot one thing is not: war with NATO would be existential for Russia.