I have written, opined, and preached (and whined) about this so often that I’m sure some are tired of it. Nonetheless, I routinely encounter so-called learned people who are so off base regarding this issue that I feel impelled to remind them of their ignorance on the matter.

The “American Way of War” has been shaped by its successes in WW I and WW II to the point where it now has lost the notion that war is a contest of wills between two socio-political entities. The Americans won both wars not with better tactics, better weapons, or even better soldiers. This is NOT to denigrate American feat of arms for they indeed had excellent weapons, fine leaders, and excellent soldiers. But their massive industrial complex was the foundation upon which the America’s military built its strategy.

War, as British historian Sir Michael Howard has said, has always been a conflict between societies. When I say this, I should hasten to add that I am talking not about limited war like a border skirmish or a raid. I am talking about total war. A war that is existential for one or more of the belligerents; a war where one side is looking to reduce its enemy’s war-making capacity in order to ensure its own survival; a war like what we are witnessing from the standpoint of Kiev.

For a fuller description of how America now has a misunderstanding of war, see Phillips O’Brien, an American military historian and professor of strategic studies at the University of St. Andrews, in Scotland. O’Brien is controversial, to say the least, but he makes a solid argument — at least in the case of the USA. He says that America has completely lost its understanding of what it means to fight a war. In his homeland, there is overemphasis on technology and on special forces. He explains it in far greater detail to be sure, but that is the crux of the argument.

Misreading Carl von Clausewitz for good or ill has been a century in the making. Like the New Testament of the Christian bible, there is a quote that can be lifted from the Prussian’s unfinished Magnum Opus to support almost any argument. But, continuing the analogy, when the whole text is read and considered in context, the true meaning of the words appear. Too many pundits (including one in an essay this week in Military Strategy Magazine where one author explains — incorrectly — that Clausewitz is no longer valid, likens On War to a how to guide for strategists. This argument is neither new, nor infrequent, but what the author misses is that On War is NOT a strategy handbook as so many Americans falsely believe. It is a conceptual treatise on a theory of war. That is an ENORMOUS, if misunderstood difference. Clausewitz isn’t telling the reader how to put together a military “flatpack” like you buy at Ikea. If that is what the reader is seeking, then there is always the Swiss Jomini and his “warfare for dummies” essays. (Sarcasm intentional).

Clausewitz is attempting to get the reader to look deeper, to seek meaning in the horrors facing anyone facing armed conflict. In one of his analogies, the paradoxical Wondrous Trinity, he describes a complex adaptive system built upon a framework of primordial violence, hatred and enmity. He goes on to associate these aspects of war with three components of society. It is no simple model and requires understanding, deep thought and considerable analysis to fully grasp. The trinity has been described as qualitative analysis of any given strategy rather than a “fill in the blanks” pro forma that obliges leaders to consider what their strategy demands and whether all three aspects of the trinity are balanced or whether one or two is emphasized at the expense of the other(s).

Clausewitz’s wondrous trinity associates Primordial Violence, the natural forces of emotion, hatred, and enmity, with the people. Chance and Probability, the domain of creativity, friction, and luck, with the military. And finally, Rational Policy — where the reader is reminded that war is an extension of policy, remembering that military actions must be subordinated to political objectives — to the government.