It’s been a long while since I posted and so I thought it would be a good idea to post an update.  I will focus on Ukraine since the Israeli/Hamas War is still a great unknown.

First.  Contrary to what some may be thinking, the Ukrainian counteroffensive has not failed.  Also, it has not yet culminated.  Ukrainian forces are pushing through the strongest part of the Russian defence.  Critically, the Russians do not appear to have large reserve if/when Ukraine break through.  That makes it a slow-motion horserace.  If Ukraine breaks through the multilayered defence, will the Russians be able to move their reserves (whatever they may have) to counteract against the break-in before the Ukrainians flow into the rear area?  Key issue.

Strategic moves.  Keep an eye on what naval forces are being moved by Russia.  “Aircraft carrier” Crimea is critical to project Russian power.  If Sevastopol is lost Russia will have to abandon the peninsula.  So what?  If Ukraine regains Crimea, the war is over for the Russians.  They will have no ability to project power into Ukraine and their Black Sea naval forces become scrap metal.

Platforms vs capabilities.  Too many observers/analysts/pundits focus on the former instead of the latter.  How many tanks vs ability to conduct armoured warfare.  How many ships as opposed to the ability to project power. (Note there is a fundamental difference between force and power).  There are no magical combat systems.  If one wishes to understand war and warfare better, one needs to look at abilities and capabilities instead of what weapon are being used.  As Baron Manfred von Richthofen famously remarked, “The quality of the crate matters little.  What matters is the quality of the man inside it.”  This has been an enduring lesson of war and has been demonstrated every day by the Ukrainian forces.

Lessons from Ukraine

I have been asked often whether the Russo-Ukrainian War has taught us anything new.  The simple answer is “no”.  Contrary to predictions, tanks are not redundant, they are critical to victory in land warfare.  The need for air superiority has once more been demonstrated as well as the criticality of having all the components of the combined arms team: infantry, artillery, armour and engineers.  Another critical component of land warfare being rediscovered is the Infantry Fighting Vehicle.  IFVs have proven their worth and we must move away from armoured infantry or armoured personnel carriers and back towards IFVs.

Drones have had an impressive impact on the battlefield, both at the lowest tactical levels and at the operational level.  But just like the magician using the scantily clad assistant to distract the audience while he skilfully moves something, the attention paid to drones (and they have certainly proved their worth) has distracted too many observers form understanding the bigger picture.

So, what is the bigger picture?  Simply put, modern warfare is a highly complex, multi-dimensional undertaking that requires a multitude of critical components to work in concert while still relying on the millennia-old underpinnings of leadership, commitment, morale, and luck.  Any single one of these components, and several not mentioned, can put a battlefield player on the losing side of the equation irrespective of how many weapons they may have.  Need proof?  Go back to the first few days of the invasion.  Pundits the world over were predicting that the world’s second strongest military would soon be having a victory parade in Kyiv.  Not so much.

Let me now mention what we seem to be re-learning while observing this conflict:

Logistical support.  Too often overlooked, even by the most professional of military leaders, strong logistical operators are key components of any victory.  Modern warfare uses enormous quantities of munitions, fuel, rations, and spare parts.  Modern armies cannot forage the way Napoleonic armies did.  Tank columns need trainloads of fuel and hundreds of tons of munitions. Cutting a supply line used to be a huge threat to operational commanders.  In the 21^st century, having your supply line cut is existential.

Mass:  Carl von Clausewitz, who was incorrectly dubbed the Mahdi of Mass by Basil Liddell Hart, had much to say about mass.  Why wouldn’t he?  He fought during the Napoleonic Wars.  However, some modern theorists, strategists and observers have been downplaying the importance of mass in the past couple of decades.  Concepts like “surgical strikes” or “precision munitions” have led many to mistakenly believe that if you can destroy a key component of an enemy force, (see the USAF 5 Ring Theory) then that force will become irrelevant.  Not so fast.

It is certainly true that the century-old concept of brain warfare, of killing the brain of the enemy force (JFC Fuller wrote about armour formations killing HQs, thereby putting a bullet through the brain of the enemy) remains true.  But it is more complicated that simply striking an HQ with a missile or a drone.  Primarily, such tactics require a deep understanding of how interconnected your enemy’s forces are.  This inter-connectivity is what builds combat power; cut the connexions and the combat power is diminished and ultimately destroyed.  How the components are connected to build combat power is determined by a combination of training, leadership, doctrine, and plans.  The Russians have demonstrated that they are weak in all four of these components.  But that doesn’t mean that the troops that are severed and isolated can be neglected.  To destroy them so that they cannot fight another day requires mass.  This has been a challenge for the Ukrainians.  But they have risen to the challenge and are proving they are learning fast and innovating as they fight.  They have been leveraging those factors they have (leadership, morale, decisiveness, et al) to make up for their deficits in mass.  It proved extremely successful in the defence because as Clausewitz (again) postulated, the defence is the stronger form.  But now that the Ukrainians are on the offense, the weaker but decisive form, their lack of mass is slowing their advances.  More on that later.

Airpower in concert with land power.  Seapower is strategic not operational or tactical.

One lesson that Canada should be studying (but I fear is ignoring) is the truism that you go to war with the army you have, not the one you plan to have at some time in the future.  We have let our armed forces atrophy because of a perceived lack of threat.  I am not saying that there is an imminent threat to us in our homeland, but should Russia (or China) do something that triggers a NATO response, Canada will be unable to meet its treaty obligations.  No amount of handwringing, or bed-wetting, by our well coifed and grinning ex-drama teacher of a prime minister will mollify our allies and potential consequences could be serious and long-lasting for our country, which is so dependent upon allies and trading partners.

Modern warfare is highly specialized and complex.  It is not an endeavour for amateurs.

The Ukrainian counter-offensive is not moving “too slowly.”  Those armchair strategists who complain that the counteroffensive isn’t bold enough or fast enough have never cleared a minefield or attacked a well-prepared defensive position.  As President Zelensky has rightly said, they must win the war with enough Ukrainian men still alive to enjoy the peace.  Moving slowly and methodically to keep casualties low is a wise strategy, even if it puts pressure on an already stressed logistics supply chain.  Remember, you can spend lives, or you can spend time, or you can spend materiel.

As discussed above, Ukraine lacks mass.  It’s outstanding accomplishments thus far have been achieved by offsetting the lack of mass with other components of battlefield combat power.  In the offense, this trade-off becomes more difficult than it was in the defense.  Further, Ukraine is not able, or willing, to squander the lives of its volunteer citizen-soldiers.  Zelensky did not empty his prisons and arm convicts to be cannon fodder as did Putin.  The strategy must, perforce, be Fabian.  It must be patient and careful.  NATO powers continue to supply munitions and the occasional volunteers, but supplies are not unlimited. 

Russia is now beginning to struggle.  The promised rapid victory has come at a staggering cost in terms of economic slowdown, high casualties (real numbers unknown) at least one mutiny that we know of and scores of firings and “defenestrations” of senior officials.  How long can Putin keep his grip on a country that is already tired of the war?  The longer the Ukrainians take to advance, the worse morale becomes and with some luck and good planning, a breakthrough in the southern sector could cause a rapid and catastrophic collapse of the entire front.  Cutting off and isolation Crimea, for instance, might be the trigger to cause a complete Russian withdrawal whereby Putin will unilaterally claim victory and withdraw to face an unruly population.

Remember Napoleon: The moral is to the physical as three is to one.