In Selection of the Aim Part I, I described how important it is to understand exactly what your mission is. Now it’s time to discuss getting the mission right, because subtle changes can bring huge unintended consequences.

Allow me to begin with a mundane example, which I used to use decades ago when teaching this subject at the Officer Candidate School in Chilliwack, BC. With few exceptions, my candidates were usually young men fresh off “civvie street” with no military experience. Consequently, I needed relatable scenarios to demonstrate how military thinking connected to their own experiences. To teach selection of the aim (I always taught it in its unitary form and not the binary, and so dropped the “maintenance” aspect), I opted to use a dating scenario. I’ll be honest and admit that my description below is a modified version of the language we used in the early 1980s.

I asked them to imagine that they were going out on Saturday night with a newly met young lady. They planned to have a bite to eat, go to a movie and maybe stop at a pub afterwards. What was the aim? How did that translate into a mission? There was inevitably at great deal of sniggering and no lack of ribald suggestions. “Fine,” I said. “If we choose one of your rude suggestions, I submit that you may do all of the things I just described and at the end of the evening she pats your arm, thanks you and leaves. You have failed. Mission not accomplished. Now let’s imagine that your aim had not been one of your rude suggestions. Let’s assume that it would have been to have an enjoyable evening with someone whom you are interested in, or maybe your aim was to get to know this new young lady better. The evening progresses exactly as before but at the end of the evening, after the pat on the arm and the thanks, you are elated. Why? Your evening was a great success. What has changed?”

Let’s review. The chain of events and the outcome were identical, but one mission was a failure, and the other was a success. Why? In the first instance the young men had chosen the wrong mission; in the second, they had chosen correctly. Let’s move to the War in Ukraine.

Western nations, and NATO, have been supporting Ukraine to greater and lesser degrees based on the wrong mission. The US, Canada, NATO and the EU have all had slightly different missions but basically, they have all been supporting Ukraine under the broad rubric of “Helping Ukraine Not to Fail.” One can argue that so far this mission has succeeded. But it has cost both Ukraine and Russia enormous amounts of blood and treasure. Could we have chosen a better aim or mission statement? Clearly, we could have.

I would argue that both collectively and by individual state, we have let Russia dictate the rules of the conflict by threatening escalation at every turn. Each time a country announced more help, Russia rattled the nuclear sabre. Different analysts have offered different counts but by my reckoning, if we include statements by both president Putin and his foreign secretary Sergey Lavrov, we have surpassed two dozen threats of nuclear escalation. The first time such a threat was made, it was wise to take it seriously. Thereafter, we were simply demonstrating to Putin that he understood that he had a free hand and he could manipulate us a will. Perhaps this is where the American president learned to threaten BIG but never deliver, to become the TACO president.

So, what should we have chosen as our aim? It could have been many things, and it could also have been different by country and by alliance, but it should have been framed not in ensuring that Ukraine would not lose. Instead, it should have been framed either in terms that stated that we would never allow Russia to win or that we would ensure that Ukraine would win. Words matter.

Remember: When done correctly, tactical battles are fought sequentially in support of operational objectives to achieve strategic aims, and the chain works exactly the same way in the opposite direction. If there is a disconnection anywhere in that tactical-operational-strategic flow, then it may all have been for nought.