I began writing posts in February of 2022 and in the spirit of full disclosure, allow me to say that I was wrong about Russia invading. I could see no reason for them to invade and said so. I thought that Putin was a rational man. I was wrong on both counts. That said, once they invaded, I began predicting Russia’s inability to win their war in Ukraine, whatever euphemism they used to describe their actions. As far as I can tell, the only other person who publicly has been saying the same thing has been Lieutenant General (Ret’d) Ben Hodges, USA. I have never met LG Hodges, and our career paths were divergent. He graduated USMC in 1980 and was an airborne infantry officer. Why do I mention him (apart from believing he is well worth listening to)? Because like me and many of us who have spent a lifetime studying the art and science of war, he did not believe what was being splashed across newspaper front pages or the hundreds of web sites declaring the supremacy of the Russian military.

This incredulity was not luck, nor was it some sort of prescient talent. It was deduction based on considerations that went far beyond the visuals of new equipment paraded on Red Square or political speeches in national capitals. It was a conclusion precipitated from processes taught and practised from decades of study and analysis that many of us learned at various staff colleges and universities. Moreover, it was the internalization of a military ethos that understands that war and warfare is not akin to the analysis of a spreadsheet or financial statement. At worst, this internalization is brutality; but at best it is a form of Fingerspitzengefühl, that innate sense of being able to see where something is going — and where it is not.

As I write, the TACO president (in decision reversal number # 77) has said that the US will provide detailed intelligence and satellite imagery to Ukraine. That is good and bad. Good because he finally seems to have decided to back Ukraine (someone obviously explained that he had been backing the loser until now) and bad because you NEVER tell your opponents what you know. (As an aside, I would love to play a no limit poker game with the US president. Maybe I could finally buy that beach house in Bermuda …) Anyway, Ukraine has been using this intel to extremely good effect strategic. Approximately 40% of Russian oil production is now off-line (either cracking or pumping) and rising. Since winter is literally only days away in that part of the world, this will have a significant effect on the Russian economy and society. And here is where we pivot back to military theory.

In Book 7, Chapter 5 of On War, Carl von Clausewitz introduces his concept of the culminating point (Kulminationspunkt) for the attack. In simple terms, the culminating point is where an attacking military force is no longer able to sustain its attack due to exhaustion, whether physical, logistical, or moral. Thus, the attacker must achieve his objective before this point is reached, while the defender must bring the attacker to his culminating point before the objective is attained.

Chapter 5 is barely a page in length and there is an archival essay indicating that Clausewitz intended to expand the chapter, but even in its outline form, it is filled with enduring wisdom. In the last couple of lines of the penultimate paragraph, the author reminds us of the complexity involved in knowing when the culminating point may have been reached:

If we remember how many factors contribute to an equation of forces, we will understand how difficult it is to determine which side has the upper hand. Often it is entirely a matter of imagination.

What matters therefore is to detect the culminating point with discriminative judgement.

In other words, all may not be obvious to the casual observer. The issue is a difficult one to ascertain unless the observer knows and understands what is being observed. I have been saying it for over two and a half years and will say it again: Russia cannot win. The question remains: How long this will take?