For those readers who don’t speak French, my title refers to what came to be known in the French military as The Young School and referred to a strategic concept developed during the 19^th century (1870-1905) by the French Navy. As I described in my book Strategia, it got its name from the fact that it embraced leading edge technology to replace the use of large battleships, well as the use of commerce raiders to cripple enemy trade fleets.

Sound familiar? It just might: Let’s scrap all these large expensive weapons like tanks and artillery! Why buy jet fighters when a drone can do the same job? Drones have changed war forever! … Not so fast …

Some of you might be aware that there were no major naval battles fought by the French Navy during either of the two World Wars. Why? By the time they had recovered from building an entire fleet of small “high-tech” prototypes over various designs, WW I broke out and left them outclassed by their enemies’ fleets. They worked hard between the wars to rebuild a blue water fleet but that didn’t happen, mostly because their armies succumbed to German Army operational proficiency. (Naval historians, please forgive my sweeping generalizations, but this post isn’t about naval warfare).

But the French were neither the first nor the last to be dazzled by the prospect of using technology to avoid expensive, old-fashioned warfare. Few militaries have leveraged innovative technology for so long or as well as Israel, but even their track is not perfect. Consider their stepping into the technology trap in their 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli war. The IDF, after years of counterinsurgency combat (Second Intifada), had intentionally (or unintentionally) blunted its ground maneuver combat skills, particularly among tank crewmen. Further, under the leadership of Lieutenant-General Halutz the Chief of the IDF General Staff, who in June 2005 was the first air force officer chosen to command the entire IDF, they underfunded the ground forces in favour of high tech airpower doctrine.

Halutz wholly embraced a new doctrine inspired by Effects-Based Operations (EBO), Systemic Operational Design (SOD), and standoff firepower-based operations. Even days into a disastrous engagement of forces across the front, Halutz remained convinced that airpower and technology would carry the day. Like most EBO proponents at the time, he believed that an enemy could be completely immobilized by precision air attacks against critical military systems. The IDF leader and his close advisors had made the mistake of seeking a “bloodless war” regarding which Clausewitz has some pretty harsh words.

Here is the point: France and Israel spent enormous capital (both fiscal and human) on high tech, that in the end did not hit their marks and left their countries in disarray.

That is my fear with all of this talk about drones and drone warfare. I am certainly not against incorporating new technology. That would be idiotic, particularly for an armour officer. Technology inches us toward better warfighting capabilities, improved tactics and ever-better deterrence. What technology NEVER does, is completely replace what we have, nor does it EVER alter the nature of war.

The real issue is that the new technology rarely presents itself mutely. There is inevitably an apostle standing by to evangelize on how this new technology is actually the physical manifestation of a mold-shattering idea — if only we would listen, and believe. If only we would fully embrace it! This new concept would sweep old concepts into the dustbin of history, and our clothes would smell fresher, our teeth would be whiter …. Well, that is as may be.

The truth is that the risk rarely lies in the new technology. As I said above, I am no Luddite. Technological advancements are good — if harnessed correctly. The real difficulty lies in its application, in its appropriate use. The difficult part of this dilemma goes far beyond understanding the advantages of the new technology. It really lies in converting the idea of how the technology helps us into to a philosophy; then processing the philosophy into a doctrine; then applying that doctrine in the creation of a strategy; and finally, converting that strategy into a workable military plan.

Aye, there’s the rub.

NOTE: for anyone who would like to read an in-depth study on the IDF failures in 2006, Occasional Paper 26, We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War, is available for free as a pdf download from the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Combat Studies Institute Press here is the link: https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p16040coll3/id/204