In Greek mythology, Hubris was the goddess who personified arrogance, insolence, and violence.

Let us consider another national leader who felt aggrieved and wanted to teach neighbouring countries a lesson. Between 1936 and 1941 Adolf Hitler made a series of bold and dramatic moves, both political and military. Late in 1941, the tide turned. Why? Why was Germany so successful for so long but unable to hold on to its gains? Of course, there is no simple explanation to such a multi-faceted issue, but one answer is hubris.

Germany had waged a crippling war from 1914 to 1918, and its neighbours punished it. They spent the two decades between the wars toying with democracy (Weimar Republic) and licking their wounds. When Hitler took power, the army’s leadership was wary of entering another long, drawn out war. Hitler’s political maneuverings reinforced the fears of many, particularly the army, which was terrified of losing yet another war.

Contrary to the advice given to him by most of those around him, he gambled repeatedly. He tore up treaties and threatened neighbours. He always won. Obviously, he was some sort of “stable genius”! Not so much. But Germany’s tactical and operational successes up to 1942 had taught false lessons. The short, violent and rapid campaigns lulled both the military and the political leadership into believing that no country was a match for Germany’s might. The difficulty was that no strategic concepts underpinned these victories other than “move fast and break things.” In short, it was not a strategy.

The hubris that was born of those victories blossomed once the US entered the war. General George Catlett Marshall correctly foresaw that a long war strategy was the only way that America could hope to win and so he did what every great strategist has done: he forced the enemy to play by his rules. At first, this strategy did not appear to work but as with all long-game strategies, once it took hold, it was a race that only one horse had the legs to win. Marshall and Roosevelt saw a German leadership that confused military force with national power (a mistake the Americans made several times in the 20^th century). Germany failed to comprehend the limitations of force within the greater international community.

The myth created by Blitzkrieg contained the seeds of its own destruction.  The more they tried to use it, the worse it became because the short sharp engagements used up resources that Germany could ill afford whereas the Americans and the Soviets could absorb the short-term losses as long as the long-term strategy made progress. It has many parallels with the strategy that Ulysses Grant used to defeat Robert E. Lee. (The modern political parallel might be making threats and breaking promises.)

To summarize, the Germans inadvertently got themselves into a long war but only had a playbook that allowed them to fight a succession of short campaigns – most of which they won.  But to paraphrase Vietnamese Colonel Tu when he described why the Americans lost the Vietnam War, the fact that the Germans continually outfought the Soviets and the Allies at the tactical level became irrelevant.  They had forgotten their Clausewitz.

The current American buffoon has never read Clausewitz, probably because there is no colouring book edition….